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Abby Bhattacharyya, Esq.*

Implementation, or the Possible Lack Thereof, of
the Bilski Supreme Court Decision
INTRODUCTION

“It is true that patents for inventions that did not satisfy the machineor-transformation test were rarely granted in earlier eras . . . But times
change. Technology and other innovations progress in unexpected ways.”1
Our patent system appears to be facing yet another new frontier. Many

commentators have opined that the recent Supreme Court Bilski decision
provides little by way of clear and cogent parameters for method-claim
eligibility,2 creating a quagmire for patent examiners and patent
practitioners in their roles as primary gatekeepers of the patent system.3 The
consequences of such ambiguities are subjective interpretations of the law
that can only weaken the current prosecution mechanism or, at the very
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1. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).
2. Id. at 3231 (“The Court, therefore, need not define further what constitutes a patentable
‘process’ . . . ”). See Benjamin W. Hattenbach & Kenneth J. Weatherwax, Bilski v. Kappos: A
Divided Court Narrowly Reaffirms Patentability of Business Methods, 22 INTELL. PROP. & TECH.
L. J. 15, 16 (2010) (“Exactly what process might be patent-eligible, the Court’s opinion went to
great lengths not to say, causing widespread disappointment among practitioners.”).
3. See Tony Mauro, High Court All Over the Map in ‘Bilski’, THE NATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL (June 29, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202463099629
&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1 (stating that the Bilski decision did little to resolve what requirements
must be met for a business method to be considered patentable); Kevin E. Noonan, Bilski v.
Kappos: What Effects on Biotechnology Patents?, PATENT DOCS: SUPREME COURT (July 1,
2010),
http://www.patentdocs.org/2010/07/bilski-v-kappos-what-effects-on-biotechnologypatents html (discussing difficulties the Federal Circuit will have developing new tests for patenteligibility of method claims).
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least, result in inconsistent practices.4 The United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) has issued several interim guidelines for
Examiners in an effort to quell confusion and meld these newly decided
rules of law into the complex examination system.5 However, the success of
implementing these interpretations may be limited by the structure of the
examination process, particularly when the rules of law pertain to threshold
statutory inquiries.6 If one is to consider the current onslaught of
precedents, there is a strong possibility that cases requiring statutory
interpretation are not anomalies, but rather the beginnings of new and
uncharted patent territories.7 As the U.S. Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences (BPAI) noted:
Although a case has not yet been presented, we believe that a
similar ‘special case’ exists for ‘manufactures’ which store
programs that cause a machine to perform an abstract idea, e.g.,
a computer program to perform a mathematical algorithm stored
on a tangible medium: the nominal recitation of a ‘manufacture’
does not preclude the claim from being nonstatutory subject
matter.8
By revisiting the BPAI Bilski decision9 and the appellate court Bilski
decision in light of the Supreme Court holding,10 this article explores the
possible impact of the Bilski Supreme Court decision on the
examination/prosecution process, and suggests reasons why the system may
not be able to provide clear and precise renderings as it has been able to do

4. See Hattenbach, supra note 2, at 18 (describing how the Bilski opinion “[has] the potential
to reopen complex questions once thought to have been settled” and permits individual Federal
Circuit panels to once again “reach idiosyncratic conclusions regarding the boundaries of patenteligible subject matter.”).
5. Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in View
of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,923 (July 27, 2010).
6. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225.
7. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 130 S. Ct. 3541, 3541 (2010)
(precipitating statutory interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 101 by remanding case to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in light of Bilski); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3543, 3543 (2010) (remanding the case in light of Bilski); Ex
parte Proudler, No. 2009-006599, 2010 WL 2727840, at *2 (B.P.A.I. July 8, 2010) (stating that
Bilski solidified the unpatentability of abstract ideas under 35 U.S.C. § 101).
8. Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 16 n.6 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006).
9. See id.
10. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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for other statutory provisions.11 However, it is not the intent of this paper to
formulate tests or guidelines. Rather, it is hoped that this paper will
illuminate various relevant points that may aid others in developing
working models for examination and prosecution practice, which in turn
will better assist in the protection of existing technologies, enhance
protection for emerging technologies, and perhaps even “anticipate” better
protective schemes for future technologies.
BACKGROUND

“Students of patent law would be well advised to study these scholarly
opinions.”12
Bernard L. Bilski and Rand A. Warsaw filed a patent application on April
10, 1997 for “Energy Risk Management Method.”13 The application was
directed to a method for hedging risks in commodities trading,14 where the
claims recited (a) a transaction between an intermediary commodity
provider and consumers of the commodity, (b) purchase of fixed rate
commodities based upon calculable factors such as historical averages and
(c) transactions between the commodity provider and market participants at
a second fixed-rate where the first and second fixed rates are balanced.15
The Examiner rejected the claims under 35 USC § 101, stating that the
invention “[(a)] is not implemented on a specific apparatus, [but rather]
merely manipulates an abstract idea, [(b) further] solves a purely
mathematical problem without any limitation to a practical application, [and
(c)] is not directed to the technological arts.”16 The BPAI held that
transformation of “non-physical financial risks and legal liabilities of the
commodity provider, the consumer, and the market participants” is not
11. See Ex parte Isaksen, No. 91-2308 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 19, 1992) (stating that the PTO and
practitioners were able to properly interpret 35 U.S.C. § 112 without the Federal Circuit). But see
Sang Hui Michael Kim, In re Alappat: A Strict Statutory Interpretation Determining Patentable
Subject Matter Relating to Computer Software?, 8 JOHN MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
635, 654 (1995) (asserting that the Federal Circuit applied a strict statutory interpretation to 35
U.S.C. § 112 in contrast to the PTO).
12. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3233 (2010).
13. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949; Energy Risk Management Method, U.S. Patent Application
No. 08/833,892 (filed Apr. 16, 1996) (rejected June 28, 2010).
14. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008). See generally PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON &
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES REGULATION 314–47 (1st ed. 2004).
15. Energy Risk Management Method, U.S. Patent Application No. 08/833,892, at 10 (filed
Apr. 16, 1996) (rejected June 28, 2010).
16. Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257 at 3.
VOL. 6 NO. 1 2011
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patent-eligible subject matter;17 that the claims “preempt any and every
possible way of performing the steps . . . by human . . . machine or by any
combination thereof . . . .”;18 that the claims are an abstract idea ineligible
for patent protection and that the claims do not produce a “useful, concrete
and tangible result.”19 However, the BPAI also held that the “technological
arts” test20 is not supported by case law and that there is no requirement for
specific apparatus if there is a transformation of physical subject matter
from one state to another.21
The appellate court affirmed the BPAI’s ruling stating that that the
Supreme Court has enunciated a definite test to determine whether process
claims are patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101,22 and that the application
of a law of nature or mathematical statement is patentable, however claims
seeking to preempt all uses of a fundamental principle are unpatentable.23
The test also determines that analysis of patent-eligibility under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 (novelty) and/or 35 USC § 103 (obviousness) is irrelevant to 35 USC
§ 101 analysis; and that Congress did not intend the “new and useful”
language of § 101 to be an independent requirement of § 102 and § 103.24
Furthermore, the appellate court held that the BPAI’s evaluation of § 101
patentable subject matter under the “machine-or-transformation” test25 is

17. Id. at 43.
18. Id. at 46.
19. Id. at 23 (quoting State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
20. Id. at 28. See In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A 1970) (“All that is necessary,
in our view, to make a sequence of operational steps a statutory ‘process’ within 35 U.S.C. § 101
is that it be in the technological arts so as to be in consonance with the Constitutional purpose to
promote the progress of ‘useful arts.’”).
21. Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257 at 42, 57.
22. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court, however, has
enunciated a definitive test to determine whether a process claim is tailored narrowly enough to
encompass only a particular application of a fundamental principle rather than to pre-empt the
principle itself. A claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or
thing.”).
23. Id. at 953.
24. Id. at 958. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 173, 190–91 (1981).
25. Diamond, 450 U.S. at 961 (“The machine-or-transformation test is a two-branched
inquiry; an applicant may show that a process claim satisfies § 101 either by showing that his
claim is tied to a particular machine, or by showing that his claim transforms an article.”). See Ex
parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257 at 53–57; See also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 64, 71 (1972)
(noting the argument that a process patent must be tied to a machine or must be able to change
materials into different states of being).
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accurate while the “useful concrete and tangible result” test26 articulated
used by the BPAI is inadequate.27 The appellate court also held that Bilski
was seeking to claim a fundamental principle, abstract idea or mental
process, and attempting to preempt all uses of a fundamental principle.28
Thus the claims recited by Bilski were not patent-eligible.29
Bilski appealed to the Supreme Court and certiorari was granted on
June 1, 2009.30 The Supreme Court held that 35 U.S.C. § 101 specifies
processes, machines, manufactures and compositions of matter as patenteligible categories of invention which Congress intended to give “wide
scope.”31 However, there are three exceptions to § 101’s broadness, which
are: “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”32 While so,
review of patent-eligibility under § 101 is a “threshold test” and it must also
satisfy the requirements of novelty under § 102, nonobviousness under
§103 and a full and particular description under § 112.33 The Court also
held that the “machine-or-transformation” test articulated by the appellate
court is not the sole test for patent eligibility under § 101.34 The Court held
that Bilski’s claims are not “process” claims under § 101, but recite an
“abstract idea” as articulated in Gottschalk v. Benson,35 Parker v. Flook,36
and Diamond v. Diehr.37 The Court held that the claims were directed to a
mathematical formula which are abstract ideas that are not patent-eligible.38
Additionally, the Court held:

26. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(explaining that a computer-implemented system that produces a useful, concrete, and tangible
result is patentable subject matter).
27. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959–60.
28. Id. at 965–66.
29. Id. at 966.
30. Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 4103, at *1 (June 1, 2009).
31. Bilski v. Kappos, No. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3224–25 (2010).
32. Id. at 3238 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 85 (1981)).
33. Id. at 3225 (majority opinion).
34. Id. at 3228.
35. 409 U.S. 64 (1972).
36. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
37. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229. See also Diamond, 450 U.S. at 185 (explaining that laws of
nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas are excluded from patent protection); Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) (noting that natural phenomena are not what the patent statute
was created to protect); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 64, 67 (1972) (explaining that abstract
ideas are not patentable because they are the basic tools of scientific work).
38. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3131.
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[The claims] attempt to patent the use of the abstract idea of
hedging risk in the energy market and then instruct the use of
well-known random analysis techniques to help establish some of
the inputs into the equation. Indeed, these claims add even less to
the underlying abstract principle than the invention [held patent
ineligible] in Flook did.39
The majority opinion was delivered by Justice Kennedy, joined by
Justices Roberts, Thomas, and Alito in full, and by Justice Scalia in part;40
Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer and Sotomayer.41 Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion joined in
part by Justice Scalia.42
CASES AND CONTROVERSIES

“[T]he primary responsibility for sifting out unpatentable material lies
in the Patent Office. To await litigation is — for all practical purposes — to
debilitate the patent system.”43
The concept of an “abstract idea” lies at the very core of judicial
consternation with Bilski, namely a shift in patent eligibility analysis from
the other 35 U.S.C. § 101 categories of inventions.44 As stated by the BPAI,
“[M]ethod claims do not have to recite what structure is used to perform the
steps, making them abstract in nature, whereas claims to things,
‘machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter,’ easily fall within
§101 (subject to the ‘special case’ of abstract ideas performed on
machines).” 45 Additionally, Judge Newman stated in his appellate court
dissenting opinion that “[t]he Court in Flook discussed that abstractions and
fundamental principles have never been subject to patenting, but recognized
the ‘unclear line’ between an abstract principle and the application of such
principle . . .”46 Against this backdrop, each of the reviewing bodies
39. Id. at 3231. See also Flook, 437 U.S. at 594 (noting the chemical processes involved in
catalytic conversion are not patentable).
40. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223.
41. Id. at 3232 (Stevens, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 3257 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Scalia joins as to Part II, concurring in the
judgment. Id.
43. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
44. See infra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.
45. Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 28 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 26, 2006) (emphasis added).
46. Id.
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conceptualized the very nature of “process” claims by plunging into the
depths of Patent Acts over their evolutionary path, as well as exploring a
barrage of judicially created tests for determining patent-eligible subject
matter.47 Specifically, the Judiciaries sought clarity on whether nonmachine based methodologies could find patent shelter.48
The BPAI made the initial inquiry, noting that a “‘process’ is the most
difficult category of § 101 to define.”49 The Board spoke to the issue of
“transformation” (the patent eligibility of processes tied to machines) as it
relates to the “abstract idea” exception (patent ineligibility of some subject
matter invented by man, judicially-created exclusions and laws of nature).50
Interestingly, they interpreted the Supreme Court’s holdings in State Street
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,51 and AT&T Corp. v.
Excel Communications, Inc.,52 as difficult-to-address “special cases.”53 In
its decision, the Board held that “non-machine-implemented” method
claims that do not recite “any physical transformation of physical subject
matter, tangible or intangible from one state into another” are patent
ineligible.54 En route to its final analysis, it addressed several § 101
evaluative mechanisms:
The USPTO rejects method claims when they are interpreted to
be so broad that they are directed to the abstract idea itself,
rather than a practical implementation thereof; e.g., a series of
47. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., dissenting).
48. See generally id. at 951–55 (majority opinion) (discussing the nature of “process” claims
through United States Supreme Court precedent and statutory construction).
49. See Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257 at 6–7 (noting the patentability issues arising from
“non-machine-implemented” methods); see also In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961–62 (discussing how
an applicant may show that their process claim satisfies § 101 using the machine-ortransformation test).
50. Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257 at 15–16 (“Where the transformation of data represents
an ‘abstract idea[,]’ . . . the fact that the claimed subject matter would otherwise be considered
statutory because it nominally recites a ‘machine’ or machine-implemented ‘process’ or
‘manufacture’ storing information to be read by a machine, will not prevent the claim from being
held unpatentable.” (citing Ex Parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q. 1385, 1407–08 (B.P.A.I. 2005))). The
Board distinguished between exceptions and exclusions. The former is defined as “subject matter
that would fall within §101 ‘but for’ some exceptional condition,” whereas exclusions are “subject
matter that is not within §101 by definition.” Id. at 22.
51. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
52. 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
53. Id. at 26 (“For now, we interpret the State Street and AT&T test to be a test for when
transformation of data by a machine is statutory subject matter.”).
54. Id. at 6. The court concluded that “claims 1-11 are not directed to statutory subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” Id. at 53.
VOL. 6 NO. 1 2011
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steps without any recitation of how the steps are performed might
be rejected as nonstatutory subject matter as an ‘abstract idea,’
whereas the same series of steps, if performed by a machine,
might be statutory as a practical application of the abstract
idea.55
It was, however, outside of the BPAI’s realm to configure a
mechanism by which to resolve this issue.56 Consequently, it sought the
appellate court’s guidance in determining a test for non-machine based
processes, noting that “many questions remain about statutory subject
matter and what the tests are for determining statutory subject matter.”57
The BPAI went on to state:
This is not inconsistent with our position that not every series of
steps is a ‘process’ under § 101 because the Supreme Court’s
definition of a ‘process’ requires a transformation of physical
subject matter from one state to another. It would be helpful
if
the Federal Circuit would address this question directly.58
The appellate court obliged.59 Chief Judge Michel began by stating
that “patent-eligible subject matter under §101 is a threshold inquiry . . . “60
More importantly, the appellate court took to an analysis of “fundamental
principles,” better known as abstract ideas, which was for the benefit of
both the USPTO and the courts.61 As such, Judge Michel stated:
[T]he underlying legal question thus presented is what test or set
of criteria governs the determination by the Patent and
Trademark Office (“PTO”) or courts as to whether a claim to a
process is patentable under § 101, or, conversely, is drawn to

55. Id. at 28–29.
56. See id. at 27 (“If the Federal Circuit intends to create a new general test for statutory
subject matter regardless of whether it involves transformation of data (signals) by a machine,
then further explanation in an appropriate case is needed.”).
57. Id. at 7. See also infra note 58 and accompanying text.
58. Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257 at 64.
59. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (ordering en banc review sua sponte).
60. Id. at 950.
61. Id. at 952 (noting that the true issue in the case is whether the applicants seek to claim a
fundamental principle). See also infra note 62 and accompanying text.
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unpatentable subject matter because it claims only a fundamental
principle.62
The appellate court’s now famous “machine-or-transformation” test
came in response to a complex question that it raised sua sponte: “How
does one determine whether a given claim would pre-empt all uses of a
fundamental principle?”63 As the appellate court noted, “this inquiry is
hardly straightforward.”64 Undeterred, the appellate court looked at several
Supreme Court precedents and determined that an exclusive test that tied
method claims to a machine, or performed a transformation to a different
state or thing, was the best mode for testing the soundness of method claims
under 35 U.S.C. § 101,65 stating:
Transformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or
thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does
not include particular machines.
Therefore, we believe our
reliance on the Supreme Court’s machine-or-transformation test
as the applicable test for §101 analyses of process claims is
sound.66
However, it recognized that the “machine-or-transformation” test may
not be conclusive for emerging or future technologies and subsequently
sought the Supreme Court’s guidance, recognizing “that the Supreme Court
may ultimately decide to alter or perhaps even set aside this test to
accommodate emerging technologies.”67
Once at the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy delivered the majority
opinion.68 The two primary issues were (1) determining whether the
machine-or-transformation test applied by the appellate court fit within the

62. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 952.
63. Id. at 954.
64. Id.
65. See infra note 66 and accompanying text; see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71
(1972) (“It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or apparatus
or must operate to change articles or materials to a ‘different state or thing.’”).
66. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 956 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 70) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
67. Id. at 956 (agreeing that future developments in technology and sciences may present
challenges to the machine-or-transformation test).
68. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010) (majority opinion).
VOL. 6 NO. 1 2011
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confines of 35 U.S.C. § 101, and (2) whether business method patents
should be categorically excluded.69
With regards to the first issue, the Supreme Court chose to limit the
significance of the machine-or-transformation test from being exclusive to
merely being a consideration as part of a larger assessment.70 As Justice
Kennedy indicated, “This Court’s precedents establish that the machine-ortransformation test is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for
determining whether some claimed inventions are processes under §101.
The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for deciding whether
an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’”71 The impetus for the Supreme
Court’s limitation on the wide reaching impact of the machine-ortransformation test, as enumerated by the appellate court, was the possible
impact an exclusive test might have on stifling the growth of biotechnology
and future technologies.72 Justice Kennedy elaborated on this concern, “As
numerous amicus briefs argue, the machine-or-transformation test would
create uncertainty as to the patentability of software, advanced diagnostic
medicine techniques, and inventions based on linear programming, data
compression, and the manipulation of digital signals.”73 The “abstract idea”
analysis then became one pointedly directed at business methods patents on
the whole and the Bilski patent in particular.74 Here, the Supreme Court
chose the route of empirical evidence, using the definition of “method” in
35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1) to prove that business methods patents were, at least
in theory, patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.75
69. Id. at 3225 (noting the two proposed categorical limitations on “process” patents).
70. Id. at 3227 (noting that the appellate court incorrectly concluded that the United States
Supreme Court has endorsed the machine-or-transformation test as the exclusive test and that
while the test is a useful and important clue, it is “not the sole test for deciding whether an
invention is a patent-eligible ‘process’”).
71. Id..
72. Id. (noting that technology and other innovations progress in unexpected ways and that
the appellate court’s exclusive test would create uncertainty in many inventive fields (citing
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980))).
73. Id.
74. See generally id. at 3228–30 (discussing the patentability of business methods and
concluding that the Bilski application did not include a patentable “process”).
75. Id. at 3228 (noting that § 273 acknowledges that there may be business method patents
because the statute includes a prior use defense with respect to methods of doing or conducting
business); see also 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1) (defining “method”). The argument that business
methods are categorically outside of §101’s scope is further undermined by the fact that federal
law explicitly contemplates the existence of at least some business methods patents. Under 35
U.S.C. § 273(b)(1), if a patent-holder claims infringement based on “a method in [a] patent,” the
alleged infringer can assert a defense of prior use. For purposes of this defense alone, “method” is
defined as “a method of doing or conducting business . . . .” In other words, by allowing this
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In taking this path, the Supreme Court avoided protracted discussion
of “abstract ideas,” perhaps to signal that all that could be said had already
been done so by the lower courts.76
However, in his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens noted this
discrepancy:
The Court, in sum, never provides a satisfying account of what
constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea. Indeed, the Court does
not even explain if it is using the
machine-or-transformation
criteria. The Court essentially asserts its conclusions
that
petitioners’ application claims an abstract idea. This mode of
analysis (or lack thereof) may have led to the correct outcome in
this case, but it also means that the Court’s musings on this issue
stand for very little.77
The Supreme Court, perhaps not surprisingly, found that the Bilski
claims were unpatentable.78 On the whole, the consistent thread through the
entire evaluation was that the method claims recited in Bilski were drawn to
patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101:79 not because of the
Examiner’s holding that the claims were not directed to the “technological
arts”80 not because the BPAI held that the claims were patent-ineligible
under the “transformation test,” the “abstract idea exclusion,” and the
“useful, concrete and tangible result test;”81 and finally, not because the
appellate court held that the Bilski claims did not meet the machine-ortransformation test.82 Instead, the Supreme Court opted for a broader ruling

defense the statue itself acknowledges that there may be business method patents . . . . A
conclusion that business methods are not patentable in any circumstances would render §273
meaningless. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also id. at 3251
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“[I]t is a different matter altogether when the Court construes one
statute, the 1952 Act, to give effect to a different statute, the 1999 Act. . . . Section 273 is a red
herring; we should be focusing our attention on §101 itself.”). See Id. at 3229 (majority opinion)
(stating that the patent application in Bilski falls outside of § 101 because it claims an abstract
idea); see also infra note 79 and accompanying text.
76. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3235–36 (Stevens, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 3236 (majority opinion) (rejecting the patent application under precedent on the
unpatentability of abstract ideas).
78. Id.
79. See id. at 3238–39.
80. Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 3 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006).
81. Id. at 46–50.
82. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
VOL. 6 NO. 1 2011
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by holding that the claims in question recited an “abstract idea” under
several tests established by precedents.83
Despite the legal gyrations that elevated Bilski through the judiciary
ranks, it is interesting to note the shift in perspectives from examination
conundrums to judicial review. Throughout the BPAI Informative opinion,
Administrative Judge Barrett expressed the difficulties placed on Examiners
trying to apply 35 U.S.C. § 101 during the examination process, stating:
Given the difficulty for examiners to make §101 rejections, and
the clear disfavor for such rejections in the opinions of our
reviewing court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, and in the view of many patent practitioners, it would be
much more administratively convenient if the USPTO did not
have to examine claims for statutory subject matter under
§ 101.84
During its review, the appellate court tried to develop a set of criteria
that could be used by both the USPTO and the courts.85 The demarcation
became most distinct at the Supreme Court level, where judicial review was
entirely based upon the interpretation of precedents, statutes and the
historical significance of the various Patent Acts, with almost no reference
or suggestion as to how the examining corps is to perform the “abstract
idea” analysis.86 Thus, it is unclear how much was really gained at the end
of a very long day.
PREDICTABLE AND UNFORSEEN CONSEQUENSES

“Congress did not intend for these practical implications to affect the
determination of whether an invention satisfies the requirements set forth in
35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 and 112.”87
On its face, the Bilski Supreme Court decision has financial implications on
the U.S. Examination System.88 In the heat of battle, the courts removed

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
2005)).
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See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3239.
Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257 at 8.
See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 958–61.
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3236 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Ex Parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257 at 9 (citing In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
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themselves from a basic fact, namely that the USPTO is still in the business
of granting patents.89 The USPTO’s financial resources are obtained via
Congressional authority where appropriations are limited to the fees
collected in a given year.90 Maintenance fees, filing, examination and
search fees and issue fees generate approximately 81% of the total
revenues.91 In 2009, the USPTO was allotted up to $2.0101 billion for fees
collected during the fiscal year.92 The USPTO did not collect the fees it had
anticipated, nor did it do so for the previous year.93 These setbacks resulted
in examiner hiring freezes, freezes in incentive-based bonuses, suspensions
in non-mandatory training and reduced funds for critical IT infrastructure
projects, among other cutbacks, with projections for 2010 being worse.94 In
2009, there were approximately 15,000 total applications filed in Class 705
(directed to business methods).95 Set against this framework, and the
narrow holding of the Bilski Supreme Court, the direct brunt of impact may
be a loss of filings as well as express abandonments in vulnerable areas.96
Given its recent history of continuous losses, it is not hard to imagine the
deleterious effects of loss of filings based on a change in the course of
patent law, and a fear of protracted and frivolous litigation, might have on
the patent examination system.97 While some have suggested that the

88. See Alex Osterlind, Staking a Claim on the Building Blocks of Life: Human Genetic
Material Within the United States Patent System, 75 MO. L. REV. 617, 631 (2010) (discussing the
USPTO’s financial incentives in broadly interpreting patentable subject matter).
89. See generally U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S.P.T.O Performance and
Accountability Report for FY 2009 at 44, http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/
2009/2009annualreport.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
90. Id. at 67. Note also that this paper recognizes that the impact on the business world,
particularly in the area of small business, may also prove dire. As of this writing, little by way of
statistics is available to afford analysis of those forces.
91. Id. at 49 (stating that total revenues generated as $1927.1 million with a net loss of $54
million).
92. Id. at 67.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 46–47.
95. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Class 705 Application Filing and Patents Issued Data,
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/methods/applicationfiling.jsp (last modified May 13,
2010).
96. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.138 (2009). “Vulnerable areas” refers to applications in the business
methods, software as well as non-device medical diagnostics and future technologies.
97. See Joe Mullin, Patent Litigation Weekly: Surveying the Patent Landscape, Post-Bilski,
CORP. COUNSEL (July 6, 2010), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?
id=1202463259759 (stating that it is “ ‘incredibly expensive to ‘disprove’. . . even the silliest
patent.”).
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rulings may lead to an invigorated reexamination practice, it remains to be
seen whether this is indeed the result.98
Beyond the financial ramifications, there is also perhaps a second,
unforeseen and subtle consequence, namely that the norms of the patent
prosecution legal culture may be detrimentally impacted.99 Lawrence
Friedman defined legal culture as:
‘[S]ocial forces . . . constantly at work on the law,’ ‘those parts of
general culture—customs, opinions, ways of doing and thinking—
that bend social forces toward or away from the law.’ As an
analytical term, legal culture emphasized the role of taken for
granted and familiar actions that operated on and within the
interactions of the legal system and its environment.100
Prevailing customs in patent prosecution include the unwritten rule
that one is not to cite case law in rebuttal arguments unless first raised by
the Examiner.101 It is also understood that the Examiner will likely cite
relevant sections of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), a
secondary precedent in the courts, in formulating legal arguments for Office
Actions.102 The acceptance of declarations, information disclosure
statements and affidavits, all made in good faith without formal
authentication, is still the backbone of patent practice before the USPTO.103
98. See James A. Coles and Stephen F. Rost, Reexamination as an Alternative to Patent
Litigation or a License, TAFT STETTINUS & HOLLISTER LLP (Sept. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.taftlaw.com/news/publications/detail/641-reexamination-as-an-alternative-to-patentlitigation-or-a-license (“[D]efendants and potential licensees are using reexaminations more
frequently than in the past to challenge the validity of the claims in issued patents.”).
99. Christopher Hilberg, Bilski v. Kappos (Finally!!!) and What It Means For Financial
Services Patents, PATS. & THE FIN. SERVICES INDUS. (July 15, 2010), available at
http://xelpi.com/?p=346 (stating that “practitioners and the Federal Circuit will grapple with the
issue of what is an ‘abstract idea’ because the Supreme Court offered little, and in some ways
puzzling, guidance on this matter it may take many test cases to more fully develop this area of
patent law.”
100. INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 8625 (2001)
(citations omitted).
101. See Michael E. Kondoudis, A Case For Citing To The Manual Of Patent Examining
Procedure, PATENTABLY DEFINED, (Dec. 10, 2007), available at http://patentablydefined.com
/2007/12/10/a-case-for-citing-to-the-manual-of-patent-examining-procedure (citation omitted)
(“[R]eliance on case law can be a risky proposition”).
102. Id. (stating that reliance on the MPEP is the “safest bet” for an examiner because it
provides guidance and instructions about the prosecution of patent applications).
103. See 35 U.S.C. § 25 (2006); 37 C.F.R. § 1.68 (2009) (allowing for documents to be filed as
declarations in lieu of oaths). See also 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2009) (stating applicant’s duty to file an
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There is also the fact that the majority of Examiners and, increasingly,
practitioners, are non-attorney scientists.104 These may appear to be
unessential to the overall issues raised herein, but this is assuredly not so.
The point is not that Examiners and non-attorney practitioners are incapable
of conceptualizing patent law, but rather that their analysis is likely based
upon a hybrid of their training in scientific methodology and legal analysis,
as opposed to pure legal analysis.105 As noted by the USPTO, “A patent
examiner must accept a utility asserted by an applicant unless the Office has
evidence or sound scientific reasoning to rebut the assertion. The
Examiner’s decision must be supported by a preponderance of all the
evidence of record.”106 Thus, a ruling based purely on legal precedents,
such as that put forth by the Bilski Supreme Court, may likely suffer the fate
of inconsistent application in the field of patent examination and
prosecution.107
The BPAI has been inherently sympathetic to such ordeals, and “[t]he
USPTO is struggling to identify some way to objectively analyze the
statutory subject matter issue instead of just saying ‘we know it when we
see it.’”108 However, the Supreme Court has been a bit short in coming to
their aid by failing to provide rulings that would effectively alleviate the
BPAI’s ‘we know it when we see it’ concern.109 No doubt in an effort to
reduce the soporific effects on Examiners brought on by the reading of the

information disclosure statement in non-provisional applications); 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 & 1.132
(describing declarations for swearing behind references and declarations for traversing rejections
or objections, respectively).
104. Dennis Crouch, Attorney Versus Agent, PATENTLYO (Aug. 24, 2010), available at
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/08/attorney-versus-agent html.
105. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1096 (Jan. 5, 2001) (discussing
the fact that patent examiners must analyze statutory requirements and scientific reasoning in
determining a patent grant).
106. Id. (emphasis added) (citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). See
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1045 (10th ed. 1998) (defining “scientific
method” as “principles and procedures for the systematic pursuit of knowledge involving the
recognition and formulation of a problem, the collection of data through observation and
experiment, and the formulation and testing of hypotheses”).
107. See Hilberg, supra note 99 (emphasis added).
108. Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 11 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006).
109. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3236 (2010) (U.S. June 28, 2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (stating that the Supreme Court in Bilski never provides a satisfying account of what
constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea).
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Supreme Court Bilski decision, the Patent Office has risen to the occasion
by issuing several Interim Guides.110
THE TROUBLE WITH GUIDELINES

“The state of the law with respect to subject matter eligibility is in
flux.” 111
The powers and duties of the USPTO are stipulated in the United States
Code and interpreted by the Code of Federal Regulations.112 It is the duty
of the USPTO to grant patents commensurate with all relevant laws that are
placed before it.113 These powers and duties are the penultimate constraints
in the practice of patent prosecution law.114 As it is so eloquently stated,
Administrative Law consists of “[t]he procedures created by administrative
agencies (governmental bodies), including rules, regulations, opinions, and
orders. These procedures are often unique to each agency and are
usually not found in statutes.”115
In order to clarify precedents to Examiners, the USPTO has been
issuing guidelines with rules of examination that attempt to reflect the
change in the law.116 With Bilski, the USPTO has provided multiple
guidelines and memorandums.117 However, can these guidelines effectively
qualify precedents to effectuate consistent examination procedures as are
their intent?
The most recent notice published in the Federal Register instructs the
Examiners with the following:118
110. See Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in
View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43922 (July 27, 2010) (discussing how to utilize the
machine-or-transformation test in view of the Bilski appellate decision).
111. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Interim Examination Instructions For Evaluating
Subject
Matter
Eligibility
Under
35
U.S.C.
§101
(Aug.
24,
2009),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/2009-08-25_interim_101_instructions.pdf.
112. See 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). See generally 37 C.F.R. 1 (2009) (defining the powers and
duties of the Patent and Trademark Office).
113. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2009) (defining the nature of an examination).
114. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.116 & 1.114 (2009) (setting forth the process for requesting continued
examination).
115. Nolo’s Plain English Law Dictionary, Nolo.com http://www nolo.com/dictionary
/administrative-law-term html (emphasis added) (last visited Jan. 13, 2011).
116. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001).
117. Id. See Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in
View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43922 (July 27, 2010).
118. Id. at 43, 922–28.
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1. The subject matter eligibility determination should not be
burdensome to most Examiners as they will not be likely to
encounter it;
2. Patent Examiners are asked to state all “non-cumulative
reasons and bases” for claim rejections in their first Office
Action;
3. Examination for an appropriate prima facie case of ineligibility
must include:
A. Claim evaluation as a whole;
B. A weighing of the relevant factors of Bilski and previous
Supreme Court precedent; and
C. A determination of whether the claims comply with
subject matter eligibility of §101;
4. Consideration of rebuttal arguments and evidence supporting
subject matter eligibility by the Office;
5. A reminder that § 101 is not the sole tool for determining
patentability for claims that recite an abstract idea (§§ 102, 103
and 112 should also be considered);
6. Patent Examiners should also avoid focusing on issues of
patent-eligibility except in “the most extreme cases;” and
7. The previously used “abstract-idea exception” should be
utilized in evaluating the claims for patent eligibility over the
“machine-or-transformation” test.119
The guideline notice goes on to describe myriad factors that may be
used to evaluate patent-eligibility of method claims, and it is also important
to note that the present guideline notice is but one of three that is to be
consulted in making patent-eligibility evaluations.120
Although Number 1 above was intended to allay fears, it has the
makings of a macabre game of musical chairs with the quaking nonmajority Examiner having no choice but to proceed into the murky hell of

119. Id. at 43, 923–24.
120. Id. See also U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Interim Examination Instructions for
Evaluating Subject Matter Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, (Aug. 24, 2009),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/2009-0825_interim_101_instructions.pdf
(explaining how to utilize the machine-or-transformation test in view of In re Bilski, 545 F.3d
943); Memorandum from Robert W. Bahr, Acting Assoc. Comm’r for Patent Examination Policy
to Patent Examining Corps (June 28, 2010), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam
/bilski_guidance_28jun2010.pdf; 101 Method Eligibility Quick Reference Sheet (July 27, 2010),
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/announce/bilski_qrs.pdf.
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guideline interpretations.121 Be that as it may, there is little doubt that the
guidelines fall short in their intended goal and fail to provide clear and
concise instructions.122 The best exemplification is that the guidelines in
question spend an inordinate amount of verbiage to build up the “abstract
idea exception,” but provide no particular test or language to define it.123
While the list of factors may be helpful in assisting the Examiner in
ferreting out patent-eligibility, the subjective language does not provide any
suggestion that the Examiner is, in fact, applying the rule of law
correctly.124 As the guideline states:
While the Supreme Court in Bilski did not set forth detailed
guidance, there are many factors to be considered when
determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a
determination that a method claim is directed to an abstract idea.
The following factors are intended to be useful examples and are
not intended to be exclusive or limiting. It is recognized that new
factors may be developed, particularly for emerging technologies.
It is anticipated that the factors will be modified and changed to
take into account developments in precedential case law and to
accommodate prosecution issues that may arise in implementing
this new practice.125
Note that the factors are an amalgam of the machine-or-transformation
test, as well as the “abstract idea exception,” and, yet, the guideline makes a
decisive move in favor of the so-called “abstract idea exception.”126 Thus,
the Examiner is no closer to being able to ascertain what specific factors
should or are to be utilized.
The confusion is compounded by an anomaly resulting from Number 5
above. While the majority of the Bilski Court stipulates that patent
eligibility under § 101 is part of an overall inquiry of patentability that

121. See Paul Devinksy & Eric M. Shelton, Bilski v. Kappos—Back Where We Started?,
(Aug. 18, 2010), http://www mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?article_id=108146
(stating that although the USPTO issued guidelines in response to the Supreme Court’s Bilski
decision, there is still no definitive test for patentable subject matter in terms of process claims).
122. Id.
123. See Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in
View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43, 924–26.
124. Id. at 43, 924.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 43,925–26
MONDAQ
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involves §§ 102, 103 and 112,127 the meaning of such is correctly provided
by Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion, wherein he states:
Because the only limitation on the plain meaning of ‘process’ that
the Court acknowledges explicitly is the bar on abstract ideas,
laws of nature, and the like, it is presumably this limitation that is
left to stand between all conceivable human activity and patent
monopolies. But many processes that would make for absurd
patents are not abstract ideas. Nor can the requirements of
novelty, nonobviousness, and particular description pick up the
slack. 128
Thus, the guideline’s suggestion that any shortcomings in examining
claims under §101 can be made up by examination of the claims under §§
102, 103, and 112129 is incorrect. Each statute stands alone, and thus
examination of the claims under each must also stand alone as it has always
done. To now advocate that the Examiner look to the other statues in
support of a patent-ineligibility review requires a “combination”
examination unsupported in patent practice. In all fairness to the USPTO, it
is most unlikely that this was their intent. However, such is the predictable
consequence of interpretation in the world devoid of a relevant Rosetta
Stone.130
Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the problems with guidelines are
not new.131 The BPAI has provided a concurrent, detailed review of
interpretations through the years, and much of their opinions remain
salient.132 For instance, the BPAI stated:
Guidelines are intended to instruct examiners on how to apply the
law to the facts. The Board is not bound by such guidelines but
applies the law directly to the facts. The Interim Guidelines
127. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).
128. Id. at 3238 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
129. Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in View
of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43, 923–24.
130. Angela D. Follett, Note, The Problem with Bilski: Medical Diagnostic Patent Claims
Reveal Weaknesses in a Narrow Subject Matter Test, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 229, 233 (2009)
(“Such a change in the status quo of statutory patentability will undoubtedly have unpredictable
implications on patents issued under the old standard, applications currently pending in the Patent
and Trademark Office, and on inventions not yet conceived.”).
131. See infra notes 141–42 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006).
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state: ‘Rejections will be based upon the substantive law and it is
these rejections which are appealable. Consequently, any failure
by USPTO personnel to follow the Guidelines is neither
appealable nor petitionable’. . . this exercise underscores, for this
panel, several problems with the Interim Guidelines that limit
their usefulness severely.133
As per the USPTO, in its July 27, 2010, Interim Guideline:
This guidance does not constitute substantive rule making and
hence does not have the force and effect of law. Rejections will
continue to be based upon the substantive law, and it is these
rejections that are appealable. Consequently, any perceived
failure by Office personnel to follow this guidance is neither
appealable nor petitionable.134
What, then, is the relevance of instructions on the administrative
application of substantive law that cannot be challenged or argued on the
basis of its interpretation of substantive law? Additionally, what is their
relevance if the rejections themselves are based upon the Examiner’s
incorrect reliance on the guidelines?
To stay one step ahead of the law, commentators have suggested that
practitioners narrowly draft claims with the “machine-or-transformation”
test in mind.135 However, such actions may be quixotic in light of the
amorphous framework proscribed by the USPTO, without any measure of
recourse, but we must also consider that we are in the twilight of the
guideline movement. The true measure of their worth shall be the test of

133. Id. at 35 (citing U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Interim Guidelines for Examination of
Patent Applications for Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, United States Patent and Trademark
Office at 142 (Nov. 22, 2005), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2005/week47/
patgupa htm).
134. Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in View
of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43,926 (emphasis added).
135. See, e.g., USPTO Interim Bilski Guidelines: David Luettgen of Foley & Lardner Weighs
In, PATENT LAW PRACTICE CENTER (Aug. 6, 2010), http://patentlawcenter.pli.edu/2010/08/
06/uspto-interim-bilski-guidelines-david-luettgen-of-foley-lardner-weighs-in/ (suggesting that
“companies should also consider including claims in their patent applications that more clearly
satisfy the [machine-or-transformation] test”).
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time. Thus, the answer to our query on the guidelines’ abilities to
functionalize precedents is the ubiquitous “perhaps.”136
A TANGEBILITY PRINCIPLE

“Why should we treat information about tangible things in a manner
that is categorically different from the manner in which we treat
information about intangible things?” 137
In the course of its analysis, it was also perhaps the Bilski Court’s intent to
alert legislators that the reforms placed before it are timely. Justice Stevens
noted:
[A]bsent a discernible signal from Congress, we proceed
cautiously when dealing with patents that press on the limits of
the “‘standard written into the constitution,’” for at the “fringes
of congressional power,” “more is required of legislatures than a
vague delegation to be filled in later[.]” We should not casually
risk exceeding the constitutional limitation on Congress’
behalf.138
Given the number of recently remanded cases, it might also be a
directive to the lower courts that the patent system requires better definitive
structures for Constitutional interpretation.139 Regardless, the plethora of
inevitable legal gyrations from Bilski’s systemic review has served to quake
the terrain of patent examination and prosecution, for there have been
diminishing returns in the manner by which precedential legal authorities
136. I have always held a deep respect for the BPAI, but never more so than in the reading of
Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006) at 35 n.8 (“Elizabeth: You have to take
me to shore! According to the Code of the Order of the Brethren. Barbossa: First, your return to
shore was not part of our negotiations nor our agreement, so I ‘must’ do nothin’. And secondly,
you must be a pirate for the pirate’s code to apply, and you’re not. And thirdly, the code is more
what you call guidelines than actual rules. Welcome aboard the Black Pearl, Miss Turner.” (citing
Pirates of the Caribbean (Disney 2003))).
137. Kevin Emerson Collins, An Initial Comment on In re Bilski: Tangibility Gone Meta, 3
(Nov. 1, 2008), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/law/collinsmetabilski.pdf. Note that Professor
Collin's paper is a commentary on the Bilski appellate Case. The quote has been used outside the
context of his paper.
138. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3239 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations
omitted) (quoting Graham v. Deere, 38 U.S. 1, 6 (1966); Barrenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109, 139–40 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting)).
139. See, e.g., supra note 2.
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can affect a well established administrative system of review. 140 The
USPTO has made valiant attempts to weld applicable rulings with
administrative guidance,141 but its intent is misplaced, for one cannot inject
subjectivity into a system that presumes validity on its face and only allows
for two responses: allowance or rejection.142
In light of pending legislative changes in patent law and the
onslaught of judicial precedents, 143 it may be timely to consider tangible
alternatives that are better able to absorb large and small shifts in the law,
while concurrently weighing existing and pending examination/prosecution
policies. These alternatives should be developed in sight of normative as
well as disjunctive identifiers. One should consider interesting perspectives
such as the Supreme Court’s use of the Graham v. Deere144 ruling in
analyzing patent eligibility of method claims under 35 USC §101.145
The key to such an analysis should begin by recognizing that formal
review of some statutes under U.S. patent law might be untenable. There
should also be real recognition that emerging and future technologies are
unpredictable, and that the present system may be ill-equipped to offer
traditional patent protection.146
Commentators have suggested patent “reforms” in other frameworks
that warrant consideration in light of the changes to 35 U.S.C. § 101. One
suggestion is that “information asymmetries between inventors and patent
officials can be overcome if the government offers a menu of patents of

140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims
in View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,922 (July 27, 2010).
142. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Process for Obtaining a Utility Patent,
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/index.jsp (last visited January 13, 2011).
143. See, e.g., Letter from Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senator, to Harry Reid, Majority Leader (Sept.
15, 2010) available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/resources/documents/111thCongress
/upload/091510JointLetterToReId.pdf (requesting Majority Leader Reid bring the Managers’
Amendment to S.515, the Patent Reform Act, to the Senate floor for consideration, and further
stating that the Amendment shall (1) speed up the patent application process; (2) allow for
opposition practice during application; (3) allow for post grant review; (4) enhance international
harmonization, and (5) allow for greater predictability in patent infringement litigation).
144. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
145. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3239 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Graham
v. Deere 38 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)).
146. See Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in
View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,922, 43,924 (July 27, 2010) (“It is recognized that new
factors may be developed, particularly for emerging technologies. It is anticipated that the factors
will be modified and changed to take into account developments in precedential case law and to
accommodate prosecution issues that may arise in implementing this new practice.”).
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different lengths,” thereby leading to a greater ability to invest in research
and development.147 Thus, it might be prudent to consider alternatives such
as variability in patent terms based on the longevity of the technology
and/or the business entity’s ability to provide funding to sustain patent
protection. Additionally, alternatives such as lower filing costs for
continuation-type applications (that forego subjective statutory review) with
limited terms and protective schemes, such as limited protection against
infringement litigation practices, may also be added to the options available
for patent protection.148 While the list of suggestions appears to be long,
there is a great need to holistically explore the mode and manner of patent
practice and consider suggestions great, small, conservative and radical
from what has become an extended patent family.149
As previously mentioned, the goal of this paper has been to promote
thought and discourse that may lead to alternative standards of examination
and prosecution for statutory provisions that are prone to subjective
interpretations. It is imperative that adaptable mechanisms be sought and
implemented that will continue “[t]o promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience
and useful [a]rts” for existing, emerging and future technologies, as has
been the continuing agenda of our Patent system.150
.PP4

147. Josh Lerner, 150 Years of Patent Office Practice, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 112, 116
(2005).
148. See id. at 116–17.
149. This "family" should include practitioners, litigators, examiners, agency and private
policy makers, academics, judges, specialty bar organizations and the oft-silent patent searcher.
150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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